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THE BANTUSTAN STATE AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSITION: 










This article examines the Ciskei bantustan and processes of state formation during the 
transition to democracy. In the Ciskei, the rule of Brigadier Gqozo rested on the continued 
support of the South African state: identified as the weakest link in the National Party’s 
conservative alliance, the Ciskei became the first target for the African National Congress’ 
mass action campaign of 1992. The struggle in the Ciskei thus had some significance for the 
shape of the transition. While at a constitutional level the National Party eventually conceded 
to the re-incorporation of the bantustans in late 1992, it continued to stall change and to 
bolster the bantustans through covert military operations and land transfers to bantustan elites. 
These dynamics of state formation are critical aspects of the history of the transition and were 
at the heart of the emerging political conflict in the Ciskei, which by mid-1992 was escalating 
into civil war. This article examines mass mobilisation, political repression and the 
consequences of the patrimonial militarisation of the Ciskei state in the Ciskei/ Border region. 
By focusing on processes of state formation and struggles over the fabric of the state, this 
article provides a corrective to the prevailing academic focus on the elite negotiations and 
argues for the value of social histories of the bantustan states for understanding the enduring 
legacies of these regimes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that the years of South Africa’s transition to democracy witnessed more 
intense political violence than at any other time during the apartheid era: between February 




 Notwithstanding this, South Africa’s 
transition to democracy was regularly represented as a “miracle”; a “peaceful revolution” 
with only episodic violence, as at Boipatong or Bisho in 1992.
2
  Few who had any interest in 
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reading the South African news during the early 1990s would agree with this representation 
of the transition: a miracle “misunderstood.”
3
 
The National Party (NP) declared the formal end of military repression in 1990, yet critics 
such as Chris Hani accused the regime of adopting a “twin-track strategy” of violence and 
negotiation, and blamed the state’s shadowy ‘third force’ for precipitating violence.
4
 There is 
no doubt that violence and negotiation were intertwined during the transition years, and that F. 
W. De Klerk’s government was funding and supporting vigilante ‘surrogates’ to undermine 
the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies.
5
 As Ellis argues, by the mid-1980s, the 
South African Defence Force’s (SADF) network of covert operations, initially developed to 
undermine political resistance in the Frontline States, had been deployed within South Africa 
to damage political mobilisation and erode support for the ANC.
6
 De Klerk’s attempts to 
exert control over the security state’s fragmented operations were largely (often deliberately) 
ineffective. The weight of evidence supports the view that covert repression was sanctioned 
by the State Security Council (SSC) until late into the transition.
7
 The ANC had also declared 
an end to armed resistance in August 1990. In reality, the organisation also struggled to 
maintain control over the activities of its own cadres: some Self Defence Units (SDUs) and 




Much of the political violence of the transition was concentrated in what were then Natal 
province and the PWV (Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging) region, and the emphasis of 
the existing literature reflects this geographic focus.
9
 In contrast, scholars have tended to 
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represent the transition years in the Eastern Cape as a time of relative peace.
10
 It has been 
argued that the region experienced comparatively little political violence, owing to the 
overwhelming support of the local population for the ANC and the well-established networks 
of civic and labour organisation in the region.
11
 More recently, historical work has begun to 
address this gap in the literature, by examining the military operations of the SADF and MK 
in the Transkei and Ciskei during the 1980s and 1990s.
12
 
There is substantial evidence to support the view that in the Border and Ciskei region of the 
Eastern Cape during the early 1990s a virtual civil war was unfolding, precipitated by an 
aggressive and repressive bantustan regime in hand with the covert military operations of the 
South African security apparatus: the SADF and its Military Intelligence wing (SADF-MI). 
While the significance of the state’s covert operations and the extent of violence in the Ciskei 
were revealed in a series of contemporary media exposes, not least in the wake of the 
shooting at the Bisho stadium on the 7th September 1992, they have remained largely absent 
from subsequent academic accounts of the transition.
13
 Throughout the late-apartheid period 
(c.1986-1994), the security state funded covert operations and private front companies to 
escalate existing political competition between Africanists and Charterists, supporting and 
arming opposition groups to terrorise United Democratic Front (UDF) and ANC supporters, 
while seeking to establish an alternative ‘Xhosa Resistance Movement’ in the Eastern Cape.
14
 
During the 1990s these operations were unleashed on the rural areas of the Ciskei to bolster 
the bantustan state and its networks of patronage under Brigadier ‘Oupa’ Gqozo. 
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The future of the bantustans, or ‘homelands’,
15
 was a pivotal issue throughout the 
negotiations.
16
  Reshaping and limiting the role of ‘traditional authorities’ in the new South 
Africa was critical for the possibilities of democracy in South Africa’s rural areas.
17
 While 
some of the more recent historiography on the bantustans in the transition focuses on the 
actions of homeland leaders as they sought to secure their own futures, work by Mathis and 
Gibbs examines the critical local dynamics of mobilisation, repression, political violence and 
state formation.
18
  Accounts that address these local dynamics and thereby augment the 
prevailing focus on the elite-level negotiations are critical for the development of a more 
nuanced historical understanding of processes of state formation in the bantustans during the 
transition and, indeed, their afterlives. This paper examines the relations through which the 
Ciskei state was sustained during the late apartheid period: it explores political violence, 
patrimonialism and their connections.
19
 
The bantustans were patrimonial regimes, with a fragile legitimacy dependent on their 
relationship with Pretoria. Their leaders were “state managers”: reliant on funding from the 
central state, their power rested on their ability to garner support through the patronage of 
state resources and the decentralisation of control over local governance.
20
 Political power 
was built around the gate-keeping of access to limited state resources, including land, 
pensions, labour contracts, state funds and employment in the bureaucracy. Amid the scarcity 
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of land and employment, competition over resources fuelled rivalries between and within 
patronage networks.
21
 State funding for bantustan bureaucracies grew only very slowly and 
did not keep pace with inflation, leading these regimes into the accumulation of private debt 
and hindering their already very limited capacity to provide basic services.
22
  
Amid economic recession from the mid-1970s, the fragile legitimacy of bantustan regimes 
was further eroded by local civic mobilisation.
23
 While the bantustans failed as political 
projects, they resorted to more trenchant forms of repression. One of the significant 
consequences of homeland independence was that the leaders of the nominally independent 
bantustans (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei, or TBVC) exercised control over a 
military-security apparatus.
24
 If the bantustans were created as a political bulwark to demands 
for liberation, by the 1990s they had become a key focus of the security state’s activities. 
After the Soweto Uprising, the TBVC states took on a new role in Botha’s Total Strategy as 
“security buffers”, owing to their proximity to the Frontline States where the ANC in exile 
operated.
25
 Bantustan elites trod the “politics of the tightrope”, vying for popular support 
amid the widespread rejection of apartheid authority while continuing to depend on funding 
from Pretoria for their life source and on the growing influence of SADF-MI military 
operations for their monopoly on violence.
26
 While Buthelezi perfected the act, the rise and 
the inconstant politics of Brigadier Gqozo in the Ciskei - brought to power through a military 
coup in 1990; first ally then enemy of the UDF, Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) and 
ANC - also reveals some of these tensions. 
Drawing on published and historical sources - including South African newspapers, archives 
of the Independent Board of Inquiry into Violence (IBI), and materials emanating from the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) - this article traces the collapse of the Ciskei 
regime during the early 1990s amid the proliferation of political violence in the region. While 
at a constitutional level the National Party eventually conceded to the re-incorporation of the 
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bantustans, it continued to stall change and to bolster these regimes through its (con)federal 
agenda.
27
 The paper examines the continued significance of repressive covert operations by 
SADF-MI during the years of the transition and develops an account of the patrimonial 
militarisation of the state in the Ciskei during the late apartheid period. These dynamics of 
state formation are critical aspects of the history of the transition and were at the heart of the 
emerging political conflict in the Ciskei. By focusing on processes of state formation and 
struggles over the state at local level, this article provides a corrective to the prevailing 
academic focus on the elite negotiations and points to the importance of social histories of the 
bantustans for understanding their enduring legacies. 
  
COVERT OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN CAPE, 1986-1990 
 
During the popular insurrection of 1985, the state had lost control in the townships of Port 
Elizabeth and it struggled to suppress the deeply-rooted democratic organisations in other 
small towns in the region. In response, the heads of the South African military set out to 
‘normalise’ the situation in the Eastern Cape through a multi-pronged strategy of ‘counter-
revolutionary warfare’ under the SADF’s Eastern Province Command.
28
 This strategy 
employed a plethora of front companies, covert military units and hit squads to attack and kill 
UDF activists while attempting to foster an alternative ‘resistance movement’ to counter the 
ANC’s influence in the region.
29
 
In 1986, the SADF launched ‘Operation Katzen’ to remove Lennox Sebe and consolidate the 
Ciskei and Transkei under the Transkei leadership.
30
 Through a series of covert activities 
under Katzen (so named after General AG ‘Kat’ Liebenburg and General CP ‘Joffel’ van der 
Westhuizen), the SADF planned to foster a pan-‘Xhosa Resistance Movement’ (XRM) in the 
Eastern Cape, emulating Inkatha to bolster the bantustan regime and as a bulwark to  the 
ANC in the region.
31
 The scale of covert operations by SADF-MI in the Eastern Cape during 
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the second half of the 1980s was extensive, involving an elaborate set of front companies and 
ostensibly independent ‘educational’ organisations, including Adult Education Consultants 
and its subsidiary Dynamic Teaching.
32
 Much of this activity was coordinated under the 
Eastern Province Command under Van der Westhuizen and was sanctioned at the highest 
level by the State Security Council.
33
 Van der Westhuizen controlled 30,000 members of the 
SADF, including the covert operations responsible for the murder of the Cradock Four in 
1985;
34
 the murders of the PEBCO Three in 1985; the Motherwell bombing in 1989; and 
various attempted coups in the Ciskei and Transkei.
35
 During the States of Emergency in 
1985 and 1986, the Eastern Cape had perhaps the highest level of repression and detention in 
the country. As Flanagan argues, the region was understood by the security regime as the 
ANC’s ‘powerbase’; as a central battleground in the war for South Africa.
36
 
SADF-MI continued to cultivate political conflict through arming Africanist organisations. 
The Eastern Province Command had funded and supported Reverend Ebenezer Maqina, (one-
time Black Consciousness activist, first in Port Elizabeth during the mid-1980s and then from 
the late 1980s in Uitenhage-KwaNobuhle), in the development of the vigilante organisation 
amaAfrika.
37
 From the early 1980s, SADF-MI found a partner in Maqina to aggravate 
existing conflicts between the UDF and the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO), by 
funding and arming Maqina and his clients and, from 1986, through the establishment of 
amaAfrika via front organisations including Adult Education.
38
 A number of former members 
of amaAfrika in Uitenhage later became members of the PAC and there was a considerable 
overlap between the local organisational structures of these two groups.
39
 
The SADF’s attempts to remove Sebe revealed the limits of the power of the central state to 
control governance in the bantustans. Sebe had become an embarrassment to the 
government’s scheme of independent homelands: his personal aggrandisement and brutal 
repression had alienated local people and in so doing strengthened support for the liberation 
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movements in the region. Botha and his ‘securocacy’ pursued an alternative hegemonic 
project and looked to Buthelezi’s model of Inkatha for a more durable solution. The 
Africanist rhetoric of Maqina and AZAPO fitted with the SADF’s desire to foster an 
alternative ‘Xhosa Resistance Movement’ to counter the ANC, while Maqina presented as a 
possible Buthelezi of the Eastern Cape.
40
 As Bantu Holomisa argued in 1993, the revelations 
about Katzen provided clues as to the ongoing strategies of repression during the transition.
41
 
While Katzen failed, its substance was carried forward in the creation of the euphemistically-
named African Democratic Movement (ADM) under Brigadier Gqozo during the early 1990s. 
SADF-MI’s covert operations spanned the Eastern and Western Cape linking amaAfrica and 
the ADM in the Eastern Cape with the activities of the Witdoeke and the Western Cape 
United Squatters Association (WECUSA) in the Western Cape.
42
 Prince Gobingca, leader of 
the Witdoeke, was ‘a key player’ in various sites of violence in the Eastern and Western Cape 
through his involvement with WECUSA, the ADM and SADF-MI.
43
 Gobinca had also 
become associated with an ANC SDU in Khayelitsha, over which the ANC had lost control, 
and which had struck up connections with Gobingca and the ADM in the Ciskei in order to 
obtain weapons.
44
 The militarisation of the bantustan state through the funding of covert 
operations thus developed a patrimonial character. This had the effect of blurring the lines of 
political opposition, as decentralised militias sought to access arms through whatever means 
possible.  
 
THE ADM AND THE ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE IN THE CISKEI (1990-1993) 
By the late 1980s, the fragile, repressive and hated system of Tribal Authorities created by 
the apartheid regime in the Ciskei had all but collapsed under the weight of popular 
insurrection and civic mobilisation. In many localities, Residents’ Associations had assumed 
control over the local allocation of land and housing, effectively casting out headmen.
45
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When Gqozo came to power in March 1990, having ousted Lennox Sebe in a military coup 
supported by SADF-MI, his promise of a conciliatory politics was widely embraced. There 
were high hopes among the popular movement that Gqozo would emulate Bantu Holomisa’s 
military rule in the Transkei, which provided some shelter to the ANC. After the coup, Gqozo 
appeared at political rallies alongside ANC leaders and professed a commitment to 
democracy, human rights, freedom of speech and free association. He dismissed the 
illegitimate headmen who had been appointed under Sebe’s regime, tacitly acknowledging 
the widespread failure of Tribal Authorities and the de facto authority of Residents’ 
Associations and other civics who had assumed roles in local governance.
46
 
Despite his initial overtures, by February 1991 Gqozo’s stance had shifted. This was due in 
part to the growing influence of SADF-MI. Amid growing calls for his resignation, and being 
fed information by the personnel of SADF-MI, Gqozo became increasingly paranoid about 
the possibility of a coup by the ANC to oust him. Following a series of reported coups against 
his government, a ‘silent coup’ was staged by SADF-MI, which came to assume control over 
the Ciskei government.
47
 In late 1990 SADF-MI established a new covert operation known 
euphemistically as International Research (IR, later Ciskei Intelligence Services, or CIS). IR-
CIS was engaged in the destabilisation of the Ciskei’s rural areas, meting out violent attacks 
on known political adversaries and recruiting askaris through private covert organisations 
concealed as Adult Education initiatives.
48
 
While military intelligence personnel fed Gqozo misinformation and fuelled his fear of being 
unseated by the ANC,
49
 the changing political alliances of the Ciskei General must also be 
understood in relation to the challenge posed to the patrimonial bantustan regime by strikes 
and civic mobilisation. Land invasions and the influence of Residents’ Associations 
undermined the local relations on which the territorial power of his regime rested, while 
strikes by civil servants undermined its viability. The thin veneer of Gqozo’s democratic 
commitments and his failure to placate opposition had been revealed in July 1990, when 
residents of Thornhill, an impoverished and densely populated resettlement area in the 
northern Ciskei, moved onto land in the vicinity held by the South African Native Trust 
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(SANT). They were forced back to Thornhill at gunpoint by the Ciskei Defence Force (CDF). 
The Mdantsane Residents’ Association (MDARA) was denied the right to protest the Ciskei 
government’s inaction over the housing shortage in this large urban township outside East 
London.
50
 Meanwhile, a strike wave had begun in the Ciskei’s civil service. Initiated in April 
1990 by nurses at Cecilia Makiwane hospital, the strike had spread to include other hospital 
staff and civil service employees, demanding wages equal to South African employees. The 
strikes were met with heavy repression by Gqozo’s regime and workers were forced to return 
to their posts. From February 1991, the strikes multiplied across the civil service, provoked 
further by Gqozo’s declaration that Ciskei’s residents must not participate in the proposed 
national stay away. Striking workers staged a series of marches on the capital of Bisho and 
ground the Ciskei’s administration to a halt. The Ciskei state again responded with violent 
repression, arresting activists and engaging in widespread intimidation. Some workers were 
forcibly removed from their government-owned homes.
51
 Under the duress of a failing 
administration, Gqozo was forced to negotiate, and called in the Tripartite Alliance (ANC; 
Congress of South African Trade Unions- COSATU; South African Communist Party- 
SACP) to negotiate on behalf of the National Education, Health and Allied Workers’ Union 
(NEHAWU) who had organised the strike. On 1 March 1991, the strikers marched again on 
Bisho, demanding Gqozo’s resignation, the reincorporation of the Ciskei into South Africa, 
and the recognition of trade unions and popular structures of local government.
52
 When an 
agreement was reached and not heeded by Gqozo’s regime, the strike again resumed. Amid 
mounting tensions, strikes, protests and repression in Hewu in the northern Ciskei, a partial 
state of emergency was declared in Whittlesea on 27 April 1991.
53
 
The other key dimension of the Ciskei’s emerging political crisis stemmed from Gqozo’s 
attempts to restore the historic authorities of the bantustan regime: Tribal Authorities and 
headmen. Proposals to reinstate headmen in the Ciskei had been made early in 1991, 
following the repression at Thornhill and Mdantsane, but these only came into force in June 
1991. In July, a new directive instructed all magistrates in Ciskei to reappoint headmen and to 
disregard the local authority of popularly-elected Residents’ Associations. Simultaneously, 
Gqozo launched his new political party, the ADM, which was explicitly modelled on Inkatha. 
On 2 September 1991, Gqozo appeared with Buthelezi on state television calling “moderate” 
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leaders to join together, airing the alliance between the two bantustan leaders.
54
 At the launch 
of the ADM, Gqozo publically stated his intention to “clean up Ciskei.”
55
 A series of political 
purges ensued, involving the removal of Ciskei government ministers critical of Gqozo, 
expulsions from the police force, and the removal of Radio Ciskei employees who had 
allowed government opponents to air their views.
56
 The ADM was heavily supported by the 
covert military operations of IR-CIS and was established to buttress the local power of 
headmen, who were in turn charged with promoting the organisation.
57
 Through the ADM, 
Gqozo hoped to shore up his alliance with Inkatha and the NP, hedging his bets by supporting 
a federal agenda while preparing the ground to wage a battle in multiparty elections.
58
 Having 
failed to placate civic mobilisation, repression through the ADM and SADF-MI covert 
operations was designed to reassert political control over local governance and the structures 
of state patronage. As Human Rights Watch argued, “One of the aims of the ADM… is to 
recruit traditional community leaders with the aim of moving local government under the 
direct control of the military regime.”
59
 
The re-imposition of headmen and the attack on local democratic authority that this 
constituted provoked popular anger and unleashed a wave of violence across the Ciskei. By 
October 1991, the conflict between the ADM and headmen on the one hand, and local 
populations sympathetic to the ANC-aligned civics on the other, had reached “crisis 
proportions.”
60
 “Anger in the Ciskei is growing and both resistance to the military rule and 
reaction to this resistance is becoming increasingly violent”, the IBI reported.
61
 Gqozo rallied 
for popular support of the ADM in its war against the ANC, which centred on Hewu, King 
Williamstown and Alice. At the latter, Chief Maqoma, supported by the murderous IR-CIS, 
had thrown his weight behind headmen, arming them heavily. There was also some 
speculation within Ciskei government circles that South Africa preferred Maqoma to Gqozo 
as a more predictable and conservative leader of the homeland.
62
  
More than six hundred people were arrested or detained from July to September 1991 in 
connection with conflicts over the re-imposition of headmen in the Ciskei. Seventy-two faced 
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court charges, some for intimidation and murder. A number of violent clashes had taken place, 
resulting in at least two deaths: the property of headmen and ADM supporters had been 
burned; there was a hijacking, and an ADM supporter’s home was attacked with grenades. 
More than twenty headmen had resigned by October 1991.
63
 On 28 October 1991, Gqozo 
declared on Radio Ciskei: “I say to the police they should hit silly people on the head because 
the courts take a long time while they continue to burn people.”
64
 Having signed the National 
Peace Accord the previous month, in contravention of legal process and surprising his 
advisers and the South African government, on 29 October Gqozo announced a State of 
Emergency across the Ciskei.
65
 The South African government declared that it would not 
intervene to revoke the State of Emergency: Gqozo’s repression of the ANC was bolstered by 
the SADF’s covert operations (IR-CIS) and his intransigence was highly convenient if not 
clearly strategic.  The State of Emergency was only formally lifted on 17 November under 




The escalation of violence in the Ciskei throughout 1991 provides an essential context for 
understanding the mass action campaign of the following year, as the ANC leadership 
responded to the ensuing crisis. The return to the Ciskei’s rural areas of highly trained MK 
fighters also fuelled this conflict.
67
 A spiral of violence - involving attacks by Ciskei police 
and SADF-MI covert operations on ANC supporters, coupled by reprisals and attacks on 




Amid this turmoil, and frustrated with the slow pace of negotiations, in mid-1992 an SACP 
grouping called for mass action to bring down the homeland regimes and homed in on the 
Ciskei as the first and most vulnerable target for the so-called ‘Leipzig option’. They 
proposed to overthrow the regime through popular action and drew inspiration from the 
‘peaceful revolution’ in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the collapse of 
communist rule in Eastern Europe. In doing so, they responded to the strikes already in 
motion in the Ciskei. Gqozo insisted that his regime would meet the proposed protest with the 
full use of military force. On 7 September, led by senior leaders including Chris Hani, Ronnie 
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Kasrils, Steve Tshwete and Cyril Ramaphosa, a large demonstration of peaceful protesters 
marched to the stadium at Bisho, the capital of the Ciskei homeland. One group of protesters, 
led by Kasrils, attempted to break out of the stadium into which the crowd had been corralled, 
to proceed to the government buildings in Bisho. As they did so, the CDF opened fire on 
protesters, killing 29 people.
69
 The supposed ‘Leipzig option’ miscalculated the continuity of 
political alliances in South Africa and underplayed the likelihood of violent state repression, 
which had been widely anticipated in Leipzig. The NP government had not disowned its 
bantustan project: instead the government refrained from disciplining Gqozo, whose 
intransigence was expedient for the NP’s political strategy. 
 
COMPROMISE, NEGOTIATIONS AND THE FUDGING OF FEDERALISM 
The brutality and obstinacy of Gqozo’s regime, supported as it was by SADF-MI, was 
convenient, if embarrassing, for the NP. The Bisho Massacre did not bring an end to the 
violence nor did it force the NP to step back from its agenda of bolstering the homeland 
regimes and their politics of patronage. Following the massacre and widespread global 
condemnation of the NP government’s complicity in the killing of peaceful demonstrators, 
Pretoria signalled that reincorporation of the independent homelands was on the cards.
70
 The 
government had been proposing the replacement of the bantustans by nine regions since the 
previous year, yet while pedalling such rhetoric, no such legislation had emerged.
71
 Less than 
an admission that the homelands should be disbanded, this was another step in the ‘fudging’ 
of federalism, as the government continued to press for the protection of white interests by 




The NP and the security establishment continued to protect its minority interests by 
promoting the authority of bantustan elites long after the formal admission that the bantustans 
would be incorporated into a single state as the ANC demanded. Like military strategy, state 
governance during the transition continued on a similar path, as the government held out for 
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federal or regional concessions. Despite having repealed the Land Acts (1913, 1936) and 
Group Areas Act (1950) in 1991, the NP government continued to provide land to homeland 
regimes to shore up their authority. In the latter part of 1992, there was an outcry by land 
activists and civics at revelations that the government had continued to transfer land to the 
bantustans in the months following the breakdown of CODESA (Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa), in order to bolster the local power and patronage of chiefs, 
headmen and homeland regimes.
73
 Responding to revelations of secret land transfers to the 
administrations of ‘independent’ homelands including Bophutatwana and Ciskei, as well as 
proposed further transfers to the ‘self-governing’ territories of QwaQwa, Lebowa and 
KwaZulu, the South African Council of Churches called for a moratorium on land transfers 
until the establishment of a representative government. The ANC and AFRA (Association for 
Rural Advancement) also condemned the transfers.
74
 The government claimed that the 
transfers were aimed at addressing land hunger; that they were merely delivering land already 
promised by the SANT. The more likely truth is that in transferring land to the bantustans, the 
government sought to bolster the patronage networks of bantustan elites, while removing the 
possibilities for a new, ANC-dominated regime to distribute land under a land reform 
programme.
75
 These land transfers reveal the continued efforts by the regime to underpin the 
authority of bantustan elites and to bolster conservative alliances in forthcoming elections. 
The “transfer deals, made to honour past promises to homeland governments are”, the Weekly 
Mail argued (representing the perspective of critical activists and Land Committees), “aimed 
at winning allies in a future election, and not addressing land hunger.”
76
 
Indeed, O’Malley argues that it was not until the NP was informed categorically that the 
state’s coffers were empty that it conceded to the ANC’s demands for the reincorporation of 
the homelands.
77
 Even at the end of 1992, the NP would not simply “pull the plug” on the 
homelands (as international critics argued it should), continuing to back a solution that would 
give the homelands the most status and influence in the new political order.
78
 These strategies 
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were informed by the experience of the transition in Namibia, where the security state had 
experienced some success in curbing the South West Africa People’s Organisation’s 
(SWAPO) electoral gains by bolstering the conservative Turnhalle Alliance through covert 
operations.
79
 Underestimating the strength of support for the ANC in rural areas, the 
government hoped that the patrimonial networks of the bantustans might foster support for 
conservative allies in a future election. 
While it did not quell protests or violence, the Bisho massacre acted as a centrifugal force to 
bring the emphasis back to the negotiators. As the reputation of “tricky Frickie” De Klerk 
became tarnished by the alliance with Inkatha (on which he had been forced to renege by 
signing the Record of Understanding on 26 September 1992), the NP’s “Young Turks,” Roelf 
Mayer and Leon Wessels, moved to closer to the ANC negotiators, notably Cyril Ramaphosa. 
The media dubbed it the “Roelf and Cyril Show”.
80
 In late 1992 a trip to Germany by ANC 
strategists had allayed their fears that federalism would “emasculate” the power of the 
organisation.
81
 The critical sticking point in the negotiations thus far - the future of the 
homelands - was to be worked out through the details of a regional policy.  Sidelined by the 
Record of Understanding, Buthelezi formed the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG), 
an uneasy alliance of conservatives and ‘traditionalists’ invested in the regime of ethnic 
separation and determined to hold on to their power at all costs.  The alliance - including 
(alongside Buthelezi) Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana; Gqozo; and the ‘white right’ 
Conservative Party - dug in their heels against the growing consensus for a unitary state as 
the Multiparty Negotiating Forum (MPNF) got underway in April 1993.  
Entering into renewed negotiations at the MPNF, the NP and ANC had agreed on the 
principle of power sharing, but the details concerning the future of the homelands were to be 
worked out further at the Commission on the Delimitation/ Demarcation of Regions (1993). 
Where constitutionalism reigned, the fault lines remained: the NP wished to settle the 
boundaries and functions of regional government prior to democratic elections, while the 
ANC defended the right of a democratically-elected assembly to decide on such matters; the 
NP called for major powers in the regions - decentralised control over justice, law and order, 
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mining, commerce, land and agriculture - which the ANC rejected.82  The NP’s proposals to 
the 1993 Delimitation Commission conceded little and pressed to maintain the territoriality of 
the bantustans.
83
 Like Mangope, Gqozo sought to rebrand his project as a developmental 
regional exercise while expanding the territories of his proposed region beyond the Ciskei’s 
historical borders.
84
 Encouraged by the NP’s tacit and continued financial support for the 
homelands, members of the COSAG alliance continued to throw their weight around, making 




AFTER BISHO: NEGOTIATIONS AMID VIOLENCE 
While the NP and ANC were committed once again to political negotiations, the situation on 
the ground was as fraught as ever as repression, reprisals and counter-reprisals spiralled into 
civil war.
86
 Following the massacre at Bisho on 7 September 1992, violence in the Ciskei 
escalated. After the funeral on 18 September for the 28 ANC supporters killed at Bisho, 
angry mourners ransacked and burned a casino at Mdantsane, while Ciskei riot police opened 
fire.
87
 The preceding night, at a vigil held outside the South African ‘embassy’ in the Ciskei, 
ANC Youth League President Peter Mokaba called for confrontation, proclaiming that “[t]he 
time has come for us to return fire with fire. . . . We must fight, comrades.”
88
 At the end of 
October 1992 the IBI reported that “[t]here is an undeclared war between the Ciskei 
government, the government-linked African Democratic Movement (ADM) and the South 
African force on the one hand, and the African National Congress and its supporters on the 
other.”
89
 The violent conflict that had characterised the eighteen-month period since early 
1991 appeared to “be escalating to a Natal-style conflict.”
90
 More sophisticated weaponry 
was being used by both sides. The IBI was sympathetic to the ANC and its allies, reporting a 
series of savage attacks that were being carried out by the Ciskei regime against almost 
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anyone who had had contact with ANC officials and independent monitors.
91
 Later, the TRC 
reported that after the Bisho massacre, ongoing clashes between the ADM and ANC had 
evolved into “overt warfare”, with the majority of attacks carried out by ANC-aligned groups 
in reprisals against people associated with the regime, not least headmen.
92
  
The Ciskei state garnered local influence through its ability to allocate land and resources and 
to mobilise support among the landless.
93
 The continued mobilisation of ‘squatters’ in 
Residents Associations aligned with SANCO (South African National Civic Organisation) 
posed an ongoing challenge to the local authority of the Ciskei regime.
94
 In 1990, shortly 
after coming to power, Gqozo encouraged landless people to build on any available open 
space within the Ciskei.
95
 He arguably did so in an attempt to placate and undermine the 
Residents’ Associations, not least in Hewu. But in January 1993, following the re-imposition 
of headmen; amid ongoing political violence between the ANC and ADM and following 
reprisals after the Bisho massacre, Gqozo cracked down on shack-dwellers in Mdantsane and 
across the Ciskei, giving them just a week to move.
96
 Gqozo’s erratic approach towards the 
question of ‘squatting’ in the Ciskei reveals struggles over the fabric of the state. On Monday 
18 January, he announced on Radio Ciskei that the state would target all those who had 
erected shacks without permission: “I want people to obey my headmen, my councillors, my 
chiefs and my tribal authorities”, he said. “We are going to take action against squatters. We 
will throw their stuff away. Squatting is causing bad administration.”
97
 Henceforth, in an 
attempt to bolster the authority of the bantustan, the ADM and their patronage networks, 
permission to erect housing was to be sought from headmen and councillors. Political and 
civic leaders in the region argued that this move was directed as an attack on SANCO, the 
ANC and its supporters: Gqozo knew that “the squatter settlements have been at the forefront 
of resistance against his government” said ANC spokesperson, Mcibisi Bata; “people will 
have no alternative but to fight back.”
98
 A similar dynamic was unfolding in Bophuthatswana, 
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where Mangope’s repressive regime cracked down on shack-dwellers, not least at 
Hammanskraal, in what many understood as a political purge of opponents to his regime.
99
  
Against the tide of support for the ANC in the region, Gqozo’s regime was meanwhile also 
desperately handing out bribes to chiefs. By January 1993, twenty four vehicles had been 
given to chiefs and headmen, including Lent Maqoma and J. Mkrola, a newly appointed and 
widely-despised headman in Hewu.
100
 These “bakkies” were a bid to buy off chiefs while 
advertising the value of loyalty to them. More than this, in the context of the simmering 
conflict in the Ciskei this may also have comprised a threat to opponents of the regime: while 
building the ADM, Gqozo appeared to be arming his allies with the means to transport 




Conflicts between the ANC and ADM continued throughout 1993, while the fraught relations 
between the ANC and PAC continued to be fanned by the ADM’s patronage of arms and 
resources. Some ADM associates looked to the PAC for political cover, while ANC members 
justified violence in the name of self-defence. Following the attacks by ANC supporters on 
headmen, ADM members and other associates of the Ciskei government, a number of 
headmen, former headmen and other ADM supporters joined the PAC.
102
 In the wake of the 
attack on the King William’s Town Golf Club (28 November 1992), which was claimed by 
APLA (Azanian People’s Liberation Army), it emerged that some of the alleged perpetrators 
of this attack were also ADM members. The ANC’s Smuts Ngonyama argued that the same 
weapons used in the attack were later confiscated from ADM members near Dimbaza in 
January 1993.
103
 ADM General Secretary Thamsanqa Linda claimed that he had encouraged 
ADM members to join the PAC in order “to get protection from ANC radicalism”. The 
PAC’s recruitment drive in late-1992 saw the organisation appealing to ADM members to 
join. While offering some political protection to ADM members and former members, the 
association between the ADM and the PAC also offered APLA a conduit for access to 
weapons.
104
 In the violence between ANC and PAC supporters at Fort Beaufort in February 
and March 1993, it was reported that ANC supporters in the township blamed the PAC as the 
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instigators of the violence and believed that the police favoured the PAC.
105
 The burgeoning 




Covert military operations and paramilitary forces continued to operate against the regime’s 
opponents in the Ciskei. In January 1993, in spite of the fact that the SADF was supposed to 
be in the process of disbanding the unit, 32 Batallion was still being used to ‘patrol’ the 
border of Ciskei.
107
 De Klerk’s attempts to reign in the military had been conspicuously 
feeble, but by the end of 1993 senior SADF officers reached a reassessment themselves: they 
were losing interest in a coherent destabilisation strategy on the basis that covert operations 
were failing to halt the momentum of the constitutional negotiations.
108
 Nevertheless, the 
patrimonial militarisation of the region through covert operations - hit-squads and the 
economies that surrounded them - had found a momentum of their own.
109
 
The murder of Chris Hani in April 1993 by white right wingers was yet another tragedy that 
threatened to wreck the negotiations but which further underpinned the negotiating power of 
the ANC and the cohering of an agreement between the ANC and NP. The level of violence 
in the Ciskei rose again in the wake of Hani’s murder. Headmen appealed for military 
protection from the Ciskei state against attacks, as angry ANC supporters continued to target 
the regime’s local representatives. Gqozo’s decision in May not to prosecute those soldiers 
implicated by the Bisho massacre further incensed ANC supporters. Gqozo’s indemnity for 
the soldiers was shaped by his fears of a mutiny among CDF troops.
110
 During late 1993 and 
early 1994 a series of hit-squat attacks were waged against ANC supporters by ADM 
members and associates of the Ciskei regime, while ANC supporters continued to target 




GQOZO’S LAST STAND 
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In October 1993, as the major negotiating parties (ANC and NP) drew close to finalising their 
transitional compromise, the COSAG alliance - now with the AVF (Afrikaner Volksfront) 
too - reconstituted itself as a political party, renamed the Freedom Alliance (FA).
112
 
Frustrated with the dominance of the ANC and NP in the negotiations, the FA hoped to 
square up to the main players to push for their (con)federal demands. While negotiating over 
the form of a unitary state with the ANC, the NP continued to meet with the FA and to press 
for greater regional autonomy. Under pressure from Buthelezi, who had already left, Gqozo 
and Mangope pulled out of the negotiations. The compromises reached on the policy 
concerning provinces did indeed provide some considerable concessions to the NP (which 
was advocating for the FA): some regional power over taxation and law-making, and the 
strengthening of local government. But for the FA this did not go far enough to protect their 
political power.
113
 The citizenship of all South Africans was to be restored in law from 1 
January 1994, thereby dissolving the political keystone of ethnic homelands and the power of 
the bantustan executives; the Interim Constitution was ratified by the MPNF plenary in 
November; a Transitional Executive Committee (TEC) was appointed and the date set for 
multi-party elections on 27 April 1994.
114
 
The regime in the Ciskei was looking ever more fragile as the negotiations proceeded through 
the course of 1993. In return for more funds, a new and high profile finance minister was sent 
by Pretoria to curb the regime’s elaborate spending. Faced with the impossible job of 
working with Gqozo, he promptly resigned.
115
  Meanwhile, the Ciskei Supreme Court 
responded to the changing political scene and passed a string of legislation that upheld liberal 
freedoms including a Bill of Rights.
116
 The axing of senior civil servants in June seemed to 
signal the imminent collapse of the Ciskei, and another strike of civil servants was on the 
cards.
117
 Further revelations of coup plots against Gqozo emerged.
118
 Senior state officials, 
including Gqozo, participated in the brazen plunder of state resources while they had the 
chance.
119
 The inquest into the deaths of Charles Sebe and Onward Guzana, in which Gqozo 
                                                          
112
 P. Laurence, “The Diehards and the Dealmakers,” Africa Report 38, no. 6 (1993), 15. 
113
 H. Ebrahim, The Soul of a Nation: Constitution-Making in South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University 




 “Finance Man Quit Ciskei in Disgust,” Sunday Times (16/5/1993). 
116
 “Ciskei Bill of Rights Sets Pace,” Star (1/2/1993). 
117
 “Ciskei govt ‘on the verge of collapse,’” Cape Times (6/7/1993); “The brigadier's in a Corner,” Weekly Mail 
(9/7/1993-15/7/1993). 
118
 “Ciskei Army Officers Held for ‘Coup Plot,’” Business Day (22/6/1993). 
119




was implicated, threatened the future of his regime: he was to be charged with the murder of 
Sebe, and calls for his resignation were renewed.
120
 Yet still the Ciskei’s leader closed ranks. 
Gqozo moved closer to the Volksfront generals, who provided arms through the front 
company Multi Media Services (MMS),
121
 while the launch of his new - and to be short-lived 
- political party, the so-called Christian People’s Movement, in June 1993 was an admission 
if ever there was of his resounding failure to garner local support for the ADM.
122
 While 
formally shunning the Negotiating Council’s decisions, the Ciskei’s ruler was nevertheless 
anticipating an election, attempting variously to restyle himself as a democratic leader, while 
employing violent covert operations to support his electoral strategy and disrupt the 
ANC’s.
123
 He was training an ADM militia to support his regime, recruited by rural chiefs 
and headmen and trained by the CDF at his farm near Peddie, which conveniently adjoined a 
military base.
124
 In October 1993, a new decree in the Ciskei reintroduced detention without 
trial and allowed authorities to ban meetings: this was a clear indication that Gqozo intended 




Ciskei was the weakest of the bantustans in the Freedom Alliance, being reliant on Pretoria 
for eighty percent of its revenue.
126
 Gqozo’s power rested on maintaining control over the 
gate to state resources and a monopoly on violence supported by the CDF and private militias, 
funded and trained by SADF-MI front companies. This weakness became even more 
apparent late in 1993, as fears of a CDF mutiny pushed Gqozo to break ranks with the FA. 
SADF generals had finally reconsidered the efficacy of covert repression. While he stood trial 
for murder (for which he was controversially acquitted), Gqozo formally signalled that he 
would go along with the transitional process and elections, even if his Alliance partners still 
refused.
127
 In fear of losing the support of the CDF, whose jobs were threatened, he agreed to 
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join the TEC in early 1994 and left the FA.
128
 The Christian Democratic Alliance was 
consolidated as the NP’s electoral alliance with Gqozo, Mangope, and Buthelezi.
129
 The 
Ciskei government continued its efforts to buy support for the ADM by introducing a scheme 
to transfer state housing to tenants.
130
  
The Freedom Alliance finally disintegrated following the Bophuthatswana crisis - the so-
called ‘Battle of Bop’ - in March 1994. Mangope’s intransigence and intervention by the 
AWB (Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging- Afrikaner Resistance Movement) could have had 
major ramifications for the (con)federal designs of the Freedom Alliance members, who 
continued to boycott the elections and who had been scheming for a militarised secession 
supported by private militias.
131
 Buthelezi’s rejection of the forthcoming election threatened 
to undermine it. As it was, Mangope’s determination to repress striking civil servants (who 
demanded a fifty percent pay rise, immediate pension payouts and reincorporation); the 
brutalisation of civilians by the AWB; the mutiny by Bophuthatswana Defence Force soldiers 
and the resumption of control in Mmabatho by the SADF humiliated Mangope and the white 
right and wholly undermined bantustan leaders threatening secession.
132 
With similar dynamics present in the Ciskei, Gqozo promptly resigned less than a week 
later.
133
 Major strikes among civil servants had already stalled the Ciskei regime in 1990-
1991 and now threatened to take root again, forcing Gqozo to concede to demands for a 
pension payout.
134
 Emboldened by this, civil servants remained steadfast, calling for Gqozo’s 
resignation and immediate reincorporation; they threatened to take “Bophuthatswana-style” 
action if their demands were not met.
135
 The CDF had already forced Gqozo to join the TEC; 
prison warders had recently come out on strike;
136
 and, following the collapse of 
Bophuthatswana, a mutiny developed in the Ciskei’s police force. Much like in Bop, police 
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staged a sit-in at the police college in Bisho, demanding immediate pension payments; the 
mutiny developed as fifteen officers were taken hostage. CDF troops joined the mutiny and 
placed Gqozo under house arrest.
137
 Hundreds of members of NEHAWU stormed 
government buildings in Bisho and ordered workers out. Fearing for more than his political 
career, with a crisis looming and with SADF troops gathering on the border of the Ciskei, 
Gqozo telephoned Pik Botha, the Foreign Minister, and capitulated, inviting Pretoria to step 
in. The TEC appointed two interim officials - including local civic leader Rev. Bongani Finca 
- supported by the NEHAWU general secretary and other administrative specialists, to 
govern the Ciskei until the election.
138
 The following day, wildcat strikes ensued by 
government workers. Civil servants hailed riddance to Gqozo as they waited vainly for him to 
address them at the Bisho stadium, while the SADF (under the control of the TEC) closed in 
on the Ciskei to stall a further rebellion against the TEC by the CDF.
139
 
If Mangope’s regime was dependent on support from Pretoria for its survival, in lacking the 
independent mineral revenues of Bop, Gqozo’s was shackled to the government, now 
controlled by the TEC. The fall of his more powerful ally sealed Gqozo’s demise. The 
balance of power had shifted decisively in favour of the ANC: as Joe Slovo famously 
declared in triumph following the capitulation of Mangope and Gqozo, “two down and one to 
go.”
140
 Only Buthelezi and his ally, the Zulu King Goodwill Zwelethini, and the ongoing 
threat of political violence now stood in the way of the success of the forthcoming elections 
in which the ANC looked likely to secure the majority they needed to govern. The strikes by 
civil servants and the rebellion by bantustan security forces - which stemmed from escalating 
demands for pay increases and the uncertainty over jobs and pensions amid the growing 
chaos and state plunder of dysfunctional bantustan regimes - had indeed proved to be the 
critical dynamic in the eventual demise of Ciskei and Bophuthatswana.
141
 These actions, 
coupled with the failed military intervention by the white right, precipitated the eventual 
collapse of these regimes into the unitary state prior to the election in April 1994.
142
 As Peires 
argues, “the biggest threat to the homeland state came… from within the state itself… [civil 
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servants] possessed the capacity to bring the [bantustan] state almost to its knees.”
143
 As in a 




If political reincorporation was now set, and the interim government would not make binding 
federal protections beyond April, what did this mean for the future of the bantustans and their 
bureaucracies? Much was unknown. The bantustan police and militaries would be 
reincorporated into the unitary state, along with their bureaucracies. The new government 
was saddled with the mammoth task of reforming the legacy of a bifurcated state. In the 
immediate aftermath of Gqozo’s resignation, Finca and his team of transitional administrators 
had some major matters to contend with. Civil servants had been assured by the TEC that 
their jobs and pensions would be protected with reincorporation, yet their capacity to strike 
effectively was evident. Not least among the challenges for Finca’s team were the hit squads 
still believed to be living in the Ciskei's rural areas, many of whom had been trained as part 
of Gqozo’s ADM militia. Furthermore, large-scale state land deals had been underway in a 
bid to shore up the power and patronage of the bantustan’s elite.
145
 In the months prior to the 
April election, wealthy and powerful individuals in the Ciskei and Transkei were using their 
access to the bantustan administrations to buy up state land at slashed prices, the Border 
Rural Committee revealed. This marked the demise of the bantustan regime as a conduit for 




CONCLUSIONS: THE BANTUSTAN STATE AND THE TRANSITION 
To underpin their strategy of slowing up political change, while variously buttressing their 
conservative allies in future elections, the NP regime and the security state continued to 
engage in established practices of state formation in the bantustans throughout the transition 
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period. Long after accepting that the bantustans would be incorporated into a single state, the 
NP supported these patrimonial regimes as decentralised agents of repression and political 
allies in forthcoming democratic elections.
147
  They did so through the provision of additional 
land to distribute, while the covert operations of the security state fomented political violence 
and competition through the promotion of alternative political organisations. Through these 
practices, the apartheid regime pursued established strategies of state formation at a moment 
when the future form of the state was being negotiated. Buttressing the bantustans through 
violence and patrimony bolstered the possibility that a federal state of some sort - and thus 
the protection of white privilege - remained on the cards. 
The history of political violence in the Ciskei illuminates important dimensions of the 
bantustan state in the transition. In the Ciskei, the struggle for power centred on the control of 
various levels of the ‘gatekeeper’ state.
148
 Gqozo and his ADM sought to reassert control 
over the distribution of resources, not least land, to wrest control away from the civics. 
Through the patronage of weapons to vigilante organisations, covert operations bolstered the 
local power of the Ciskei state. The militarisation of the bantustan state in the Ciskei was thus 
patrimonial: in turn this shaped the dynamics of the violence. Training and arming young 
men for the ADM both underpinned the power of local chiefs and headmen, and developed 
new networks of patronage connected to the trade of guns between and among armed factions. 
Gunrunning muddied the political waters, as participants in the conflict struck up alliances to 
procure weapons: both the PAC and ANC at different moments became linked to the 
acquisition of arms through the ADM.
149
 
Written more than two years before the collapse of the Ciskei regime, Peires’ analysis of the 
“implosion” of Ciskei and Transkei foretold key dynamics in the eventual collapse of the 
bantustan states: strikes by civil servants and homeland police and mutinies by homeland 
militaries.
150
 Organised through NEHAWU, the South African Democratic Teachers’ Union 
(SADTU) and the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU), this strike wave was of 
unprecedented scale in the history of South Africa’s public service.
151
 As in Bophuthatswana 
(and with similar dynamics in Transkei and Lebowa) the strikes and direct action protests of 
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civil servants, coupled with the rebellion by the homeland police and defence forces, 
compelled Gqozo to resign. Gqozo had alienated civil servants in his repression of the strikes 
of 1990-1991. In the crisis of March 1994, amid state plunder and the increasing 
dysfunctionality of the Ciskei regime, the TEC reassured the Ciskei’s employees that their 
jobs and pensions would be secured through reincorporation. This sealed their rejection of the 
bantustan regime which now stood in the way of change. Further, South Africa’s security 
generals had come to realise that their aims might be better served by running with the 
forthcoming election. Gqozo had lost his patrons and opted to join the election too. 
The apartheid regime’s efforts to foster an alternative ‘Xhosa Resistance Movement’ were a 
resounding failure as an electoral strategy in the Ciskei and Border region. In an area with 
more ANC members than anywhere outside the Transvaal; where the memory of Sebe’s 
tyranny was recent and with mounting evidence of state repression through the ADM, 
Gqozo’s ostensive political party was doomed to fail.
152
 In April 1994, the ADM did not win 
a single seat in the National Assembly or in the Eastern Cape Legislature, winning a measly 
0.4 percent of the votes in the Eastern Cape, compared with the ANC’s 84 percent.
153
 
Nevertheless, throughout the transition, the future of the homeland regimes, their 
bureaucracies and ‘traditional’ authorities in the ‘new’ South Africa were questions that 
repeatedly stalled the negotiations and threatened to disrupt them entirely. Chiefs and 
headmen were given some assurance by the concessions to Goodwill Zwelethini and 
CONTRALESA.
154
 But where reincorporation dissolved the power of the Ciskei’s executive, 
the social and economic relations that comprised the bantustan state, and which had been 
fostered throughout the transition, remained. With the eventual fall of Mangope and Gqozo, 
these bantustans were not dismantled but their executives deposed and their structures 
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